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Abstract
In this work of thesis we will present an experiment, which aims to realize
a fully working quantum key distribution system for satellite communica-
tions, in order to prove the feasibility of a global quantum cryptography
network. In particular we will deal with the implementation issues that
arise when such system is realized using the already existing satellite laser
ranging facilities. We firstly address the problem of driving electro-optic
modulators with a high switching frequency while assuring a stable out-
put voltage, in order to correctly prepare the quantum state of the qubits
to be sent to the satellite. Then we will present the QKD system con-
troller implemented with the FPGA technology, that is used to control
the modulator driver in order to map the random key to the laser pulses.
Further, the controller will allow scheduling the transmission and the re-
ception phases of the QKD protocol, by controlling two shutters, in order
to avoid unwanted optical background noise in the receiver. The controller
should also be able to provide a fast control over the shutters to prevent
that the high energetic pulses of the laser ranging system will damage the
receiver photomultiplier tube.
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Introduction
In the current information age cryptography is becoming increasingly im-
portant. Some everyday activities, like commerce, payments, banking,
communications and many others, are now commonly performed using
only information technologies. While this shift in the information domain
has made life easier, it entails higher security risks that must be prop-
erly handled by the information systems employed. The security of these
technologies is closely dependent on the reliability of the underlying cryp-
tographic systems. Today, the use of classical cryptographic algorithms
based on particular mathematical functions is the primary way to guar-
antee the security of these systems. However, recently the evolution of
quantum technologies has made possible to realize new kinds of crypto-
graphic protocols for key exchange, which might allow reaching the perfect
security in the near future. This application is named Quantum Key Dis-
tribution (QKD) since it is only used for the distribution of the keys and
not for the encryption, which is performed with classical algorithms, as
one-time-pad, which can guarantee a proved security.
While the few currently commercially available QKD systems are based
on the use of optical fiber, which limits the communications range to few
hundred of kilometers, new methods that aim to extend this range are
being under high development. Recently, a group of researchers was able
to operate a QKD protocol over a 144 Km horizontal free space link [1].
However the earth curvature and the atmospheric turbulence, which distort
the optical wavefront, won’t allow extending the communication distance
significantly.
The subsequent evolution that eventually will allow building a global
quantum network is to employ satellites to perform the quantum commu-
nication. The proof of the feasibility of a single-photon exchange in space
has already been given by a recent experiment in which a geodetic satel-
lite equipped with back-reflector has been used to simulate a single-photon
source [2]. In this experiment the existing Satellite Laser Ranging (SLR)
network has been exploited to send a weak laser pulse to the satellite, which
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then reflects it down to the ground station. Using temporal, spectral and
spatial filters it was possible to distinguish the emitted photons from the
background noise.
The goal of the experiment on which our team is currently working is to
implement a fully working QKD system able to exchange an unconditional
secure key between a satellite and a ground station, in order to finally
prove the feasibility of the quantum cryptography in space. To do this we
take advantage of the existing SLR system of the Matera Laser Ranging
Observatory (MLRO), located in Matera, Italy.
The integration of a QKD system with the SLR system makes it nec-
essary to deal with some peculiar problems. In particular, in our setup we
have exploited the high repetition frequency free-space laser installed in the
MLRO as a source of laser pulses necessary to prepare the qubits for the
B92 protocol we want to implement. To correctly modulate the polariza-
tion of the pulses we have used a Lithium Niobate polarization modulator.
The first problem is related to this modulator, indeed it requires a high
voltage driver with high switching frequency to be operated. The second
problem instead, arise because of the presence of the high energetic laser
pulses – used by the laser ranging system to track the satellite and measure
its distance from the ground – that need to be blocked in order to avoid
the failure of the photomultiplier tube (PMT) installed in our receiver.
In this work we have tried to solve the two presented problems. In
particular we have developed a high voltage driver able to pilot the polar-
ization modulator with a sufficiently high frequency. Moreover the driver
should be able to provide a stable output in order to let the modulator
impress a correct polarization to the qubits. Then we implemented an
electronic controller, by using an FPGA, that is able to drive two shut-
ters, used for shielding the PMT against the high energetic pulses, and
for alternating the transmission and reception phase of our protocol. The
need of separating in time the two phases was necessary to prevent that
the transmitted pulses would raise the optical noise on the receiver. More-
over the controller was used to pilot the modulator driver according to the
randomly generated key.
The rest of this work is structured as follow. In Chapter 1 we will review
the basic notion on classical and quantum cryptography. In Chapter 2 we
will review the previous phase of our experiment and we will introduce
the setup of our system. In Chapter 3 an analysis of the electro-optic
modulators will be presented. In Chapter 4 we will show the high voltage
driver we have developed. Finally in Chapter 5 the realization of the QKD
system controller will be described.
Chapter 1
Quantum cryptography
1.1 Introduction to cryptography
Cryptography is a science that studies and realizes the different techniques
essential to pursue the goal of concealing the information of an exchanged
message between two parties. In a basic cryptographic system the message
– called plaintext – is transformed in an unreadable form – called ciphertext
– through a process named encryption. The process is characterized by a
set of instructions that form the cryptographic algorithm or cipher. The
original message is retrieved from the ciphertext by an inverse process
named decryption.
The need of exchanging information in a secure way dates back to
ancient ages when this necessity was almost always connected with military
purposes. Because of this many systems for secret message exchange were
invented along the centuries. Beginning from the Caesar cipher – a simple
cryptographic scheme in which each letter of a message is replaced by
the letter shifted by a fixed number of positions in the alphabet – these
systems have evolved reaching their maximum evolution with Enigma that
is a machine used by the Germans during the World War II to communicate
reserved information about the military plans [3].
Security of the early ciphers were based on the fact that a third party,
who wants to intercept the message, doesn’t know the cryptographic al-
gorithm utilized to encrypt the message. Given that many of this ciphers
were based on alphabetic substitution techniques, it was possible to re-
trieve the encryption algorithm – and so the plaintext –by performing an
accurate study on the ciphertext, a so called cryptanalysis. The simplest
cryptanalysis attack is the analysis of the frequency of each letter in the
ciphertext. Indeed comparing this frequencies with the well-know frequen-
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cies of each letters in a given language it is possible to retrieve the plaintext.
Once the encryption algorithm were discovered, it was not possible to use
it any more. With the evolution of cryptography, the secrecy begin to be
make dependent on a short quantity of information called key, making so
possible to public reveal the encryption algorithm while keeping only the
key secret.
Along all the history many ciphers have been invented and most of
them have been broken, proving so that they were not perfectly secure.
The first perfectly secure algorithm is the Vernam cipher or one-time-pad,
which was invented around the 1920 by Gilber Vernam. The mechanism
of this algorithm is pretty simple though powerful: considering a binary
message, the encryption is performed by executing a sum modulo 2 (XOR
operation) between each bit of the message and the corresponding bit of
a random key, which must be as long as the message. To obtain back the
plaintext, the same operation is performed on the ciphertext. Shannon in
1949 have proven that this cipher is unconditional secure – that means it
is secure against any kind of attack – under the assumptions that the key
is as long as the message and that it is used only once [4].
Although the proof given by Shannon made the one-time-pad eligible
to be the unique and perfect cryptographic algorithm to be utilized, in
practice it is not widely used because the need of a pre-shared key make
it utilization impractical. In fact, as for the message to be exchanged, it is
not possible to share the key over a communication channel in a secure way,
so that the two parties need to physically meet each other to exchange the
key prior the communication – if they want guarantee the unconditional
security of the algorithm.
The problem of key distribution was initially addressed by modern
classical cryptography by the use of public cryptographic algorithms, that
however are not able to guarantee an unconditional secure exchanged key.
Recently, new systems that employs the basic principles of quantum me-
chanics have been invented and they have been proven to ensure a uncon-
ditional secure key distribution.
1.2 Modern cryptography
In the last few decades – also thanks to the fast development of the elec-
tronic – cryptography has become widely used in many fields other than the
military one. At the present time cryptography has become a key enabling
feature for many everyday life applications such as electronic commerce,
on line banking, etc. Moreover, cryptography is not any more related only
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to secret communication, but now it can provide all the following security
services
• Confidentiality or Secrecy It guarantees that the sensitive data
can only be accessed by the authorized entities. In particular this
property allows sending a message over an insecure channel and guar-
antees that only the intended recipient can read it. Confidentiality
is achieved through encryption.
• Data Integrity It refers to the action of providing the consistency
of the data and prevent that it can be altered by malicious users.
• Authentication It provides a method that allows verifying the sender
of a message with certainty.
• Non-repudiation It is the assurance that someone cannot deny
previous actions.
Modern cryptography can be classified in two main classes of crypto-
graphic techniques: symmetric cryptography (or secret key cryptography)
and asymmetric cryptography (or public key cryptography).
The first set encompass all those algorithms which use a shared se-
cret key to perform the encryption of the message through the use of a
known algorithm, which is used both to perform the encryption and the
decryption. The most relevant cipher of this class is the Data Encryption
Standard (DES) – it uses relatively short key (56 bits at most in the origi-
nal version) and is able to perform a very fast encryption of large quantity
of data. Even though it was chose by the US as the official government
standard because of its presumed high degree of security, it has been proven
to suffer of some weakness [5], so that it was substitute by another public
standard that is called Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
The other large class of cryptographic algorithms is the class of the
asymmetric cryptographic algorithms. Such cipher utilizes two different
keys, a public one to encrypt the message and a private one to decrypt it.
In this way anyone can encrypt a message using the well-know public key
whilst only the intended recipient can decrypt it. Thanks to this property
a public key cipher does not need to pre-share the key, thus solving the
problem of key distribution. Moreover a public key cipher can be used in
the opposite way to provide a system of signature and authentication. In
particular one may encrypt a message (or a signature of it) with its private
key so that the message can only be decrypted with the corresponding
public key. If the public key is certified to belong to a specific entity, the
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correct decoding of the message proves the authenticity of the sender. The
public key cipher are build upon some particular mathematical functions
that holds the property of being one-way, that means they are easy to
compute in one way but extremely hard to compute in the other way. This
property allows easily computing the public key from the private one but
it makes very hard to obtain the secret key from the public one. The most
well know example of this kind of algorithms is the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
(RSA) protocol. This protocol uses the fact that the product of two large
prime numbers can be easily computed but the factorization of this product
is hard to perform. The term “hard” here means that the currently best
known algorithm to factorize a number posses a computational complexity
that is exponential.
Although public key cryptography allows solving the problem of key
distribution, they have few drawbacks. The first is that the process of
encryption and decryption is very slow, making them unsuitable to encrypt
very large quantity of data. The second is that the identity of the owner
of the key need to be certified, otherwise anyone can create a new pairs of
key and distribute the public key claiming to be someone else.
In practice public key cryptography and secret key cryptography are
used together to better exploit the best features of both. In particular
the public key cipher is used to encrypt a secret key that is then used in
an efficient symmetric algorithm to perform the message encryption. The
identity of the owner of the key is guaranteed by a hierarchical chain of
certification authorities.
1.3 Security of classical cryptographic algo-
rithms
To determine how secure a system is against cryptanalysis attack, it is first
necessary to define what security is. In particular we can distinguish two
main type of security [6]
• Unconditional security A system is said unconditionally secure if
it is secure against any kind of attack supposing that the attackers
can have an unbounded computational power
• Computational security A system is said computational secure if
the best know attack against it is computationally infeasible, i.e., the
time needed to perform the attack with the current hardware is too
large (in the order of tens or hundreds of years)
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As stated above the only unconditional secure cryptographic algorithm
is the one-time-pad, while the security of all the other classical crypto-
graphic systems is not proven. Both the symmetric and asymmetric cryp-
tographic classes of algorithm are based on the fact that there are still no
efficient algorithms and computational power to break them. In particular
the RSA protocol assumes that there not exists a classical algorithm which
can be used to factorize a large integer in a polynomial time, even though
this has not been demonstrated yet. On the other hand, in 1994 Peter
Shor designed an algorithm that runs on a quantum computer, and that is
able to factorize a number in polynomial time. In the following years this
algorithm has been implemented in more and more efficient ways [7]. The
greatest number a quantum computer can factorize until now is 21, but
the rapid evolution of the quantum technologies can let this number grow
unexpectedly fast, thus undermining the pillar of classical cryptography.
These considerations show us how the security of the classical crypto-
graphic algorithms are based on assumptions destined to become obsolete
near or later, and show us how the need of a practical system able to guar-
antee an unconditional security is necessary to achieve the final goal of a
perfectly secure cryptographic system.
1.4 Preliminary notions of quantum mechan-
ics
In this section we will briefly introduce the basic notions about quantum
mechanics needed to understand the QKD protocols we will present later
in this chapter. For a complete reference of the basic quantum mechanics
principles and notations refer to [8].
1.4.1 The qubit
In the classical information theory the basic unit of information is rep-
resented by a quantity called bit, that can assume only the values 0 and
1. The corresponding quantity in the quantum information theory is the
qubit, that is a two-level quantum system, described by a two-dimensional
complex Hilbert space. It is possible to map the values 0 and 1 of a classical
bit into two normalized and mutually orthogonal quantum states
|0〉 =
[
1
0
]
, |1〉 =
[
0
1
]
(1.1)
8 Quantum cryptography
which form a computational basis of this space. While a bit can only takes
two possible values, a qubit can be in a superposition of the two states |0〉
and |1〉. The general form of the states a qubit can assume is
|ψ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉 (1.2)
where α, β ∈ C, with |α2|+ |β2| = 1, that is 〈ψ|ψ〉 = 1.
Since state vectors are defined only up to a global phase of no physical
significance, it’s possible to choose α (and so β) real and positive so that
the generic state of a qubit can be written in terms of spherical coordinates
as
|ψ〉 = cos θ
2
|0〉+ eiφ sin θ
2
|1〉 =
[
cos θ
2
eiφ sin θ
2
]
(0 ≤ θ ≤ π, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 2π)
(1.3)
Such state can be visually represented in a three-dimensional Cartesian
space as a unit vector whose tip lies on a sphere of unit radius that is
called Bloch sphere. The Cartesian coordinates of the state are related to
the polar coordinates by
x = cos φ sin θ, y = sin φ sin θ, z = cos θ (1.4)
So far we have represented the state of a qubit as a linear combination
of the vectors of the computational basis {|0〉, |1〉}, but in general the state
of a qubit in a two-dimensional Hilbert space can be represented as a linear
combination of any two orthonormal state vectors. Of particular interest
are the so called conjugate bases
|0〉+ |1〉√
2
,
|0〉 − |1〉√
2
(1.5)
and |0〉+ i|1〉√
2
,
|0〉 − i|1〉√
2
(1.6)
The couple of vectors that form each of the conjugate bases correspond
to the eigenvectors of the Pauli operators σz, σx and σy respectively, and
they form a set of mutually orthogonal vectors over the Bloch sphere (Fig-
ure 1.1). The particularity of the conjugate bases will be cleared in the
next sections.
1.4.2 Polarization encoded qubit
A qubit can be physically realized using any two-level quantum system.
Some common examples of these systems are the spin of a photon, the
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Figure 1.1: The Bloch sphere. Any possible state a qubit can assume is
represented by a point lying on the surface of the unit-radius sphere. The
three conjugate bases, corresponding to the Pauli operators, form a set of
mutually orthogonal vectors [9].
spin of an electron, two electronic levels of an atom, etc. Due to the
easiness of managing the polarization of a light wave, usually generated by
a laser, many quantum communication systems use polarization to encode
the qubit. If we associate the state |0〉 to the horizontal state of polarization
of a photon and the state |1〉 to the vertical state of polarization as follow
|0〉 −→ |H〉 (1.7)
|1〉 −→ |V 〉 (1.8)
we still have a computational basis. The corresponding conjugate bases
are given by the +45°/-45° diagonal polarization basis (+/-) and by the
left/right polarization basis (L/R), which are related to the H/V basis by
|+〉 = |H〉+ |V 〉√
2
, |−〉 = |H〉 − |V 〉√
2
(1.9)
|L〉 = |H〉+ i|V 〉√
2
, |R〉 = |H〉 − i|V 〉√
2
(1.10)
The vectors constituting each three bases correspond to the eigenvectors
of the Pauli operators σz, σx and σy respectively.
The different states of polarization of a light wave can be visually rep-
resented in the Poincare sphere (Figure 1.2),which is an analogous of the
Bloch sphere.
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Figure 1.2: The Poincaré sphere. Any possible state of polarization can
be represented as a point lying on the surface of the unit-radius sphere.
The three conjugate bases (H/V, +/- and L/R) form a set of mutually
orthogonal vectors [9].
1.4.3 Qubit state measurement
As we have seen above, the generic state of a qubit is given by the linear
combination of two basis state vectors, weighted by the two coefficients
α and β. From this, we understand that a qubit can assume an infinite
number of different states. At this point one may think that it would be
possible to store an infinite quantity of information in a single qubit, i.e.,
we can store the infinite number of classical bit needed to represent the
coefficients α and β in a single qubit. Actually it is possible to prepare
a qubit in an arbitrary state – for example we can impress an arbitrary
polarization to a photon – but when we want to measure the state of
the prepared qubit, the quantum mechanics laws impose a limit on the
precision of this measure. To understand this, we recall the third postulate
of quantum mechanics [8].
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Definition 1.4.1 (Postulate IIIa). We associate with any observable A a
self-adjoint operator A on the Hilbert space HS. The only possible outcome
of a measurement of the observable A is one of the eigenvalues of the
operator A. If we write the eigenvalue equation for the operator A
A|i〉 = ai|i〉 (1.11)
where |i〉is an orthonormal basis of the eigenvectors of the operator A, and
we expand the state vector |ψ〉 over this basis
|ψ〉 =
∑
i
ci|i〉 (1.12)
then the probability that a measurement of the observable A results in an
outcome ai is given by
p(i) = p(a = ai) = |〈i|ψ〉|2 = |ci|2 (1.13)
The postulate states that when we try to measure an observable –
that is a generic dynamic variable such as position, linear momentum,
angular momentum etc. – the result of the measure can only be one of the
eigenvalues of the operator associated to the observable. This means that
with a single measure we can’t recover the original state of the qubit, but it
would be necessary to perform an infinite number of measure over the same
qubit to retrieve its original state [8]. At this point one may think that
it would be possible to perform a large number of measures on the same
qubit to obtain a good estimation of its original state. Unfortunately this
is not possible, in fact the second part of the third postulate of quantum
mechanics tell us that when a measurement is performed on the qubit, its
original state will be modified preventing so to recover it.
Definition 1.4.2 (Postulate IIIb). If a system is described by the state
vector |ψ〉 and we measure an observable A, obtaining the outcome ai,
then immediately after the measurement the state of the system is given by
Pi|ψ〉√〈ψ|Pi|ψ〉 (1.14)
where Pi is the projection operator over the subspace corresponding to ai.
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To better understand the postulate let us introduce the concept of
projective measurement.
Definition 1.4.3 (Projective measurement). A projective measurement is
described by a self-adjoint operator M with spectral decomposition given by
M =
∑
i
λiPi =
∑
i
λi|i〉〈i| (1.15)
where Pi is the projector over subspace spanned by the eigenvectors cor-
responding to the eigenvalue λi. When the state |ψ〉 is measured with the
operator M, the probability of getting λi as a result is
p(i) = 〈ψ|Pi|ψ〉 (1.16)
The second part of the third postulate implies that when we perform
a measure on a qubit we project its state over the subspace spanned by
one of the two eigenvectors of the measurement operator. At this point
another measurement with the same operator on the same qubit will give
the same result with unit probability, preventing so to retrieve the original
state of the qubit.
Let consider the case of a polarization encoded qubit. Assuming the
qubit is prepared in one of the two states |H〉, |V 〉. We can try to measure
the state of the qubit using two different operators
M+ = |H〉〈H|+ |V 〉〈V | (1.17)
M× = |+〉〈+|+ |−〉〈−| (1.18)
where the first measures the polarization in the H/V basis and the second
in the +/- basis. When the M+ operator is chosen, the result of a mea-
surement give exactly the original state of the qubit. For example if the
qubit is prepared in the state |H〉 the probabilities of getting H and V are
p
|H〉
+ (H) = 〈H|H〉〈H|H〉 = 1 (1.19)
p
|H〉
+ (V ) = 〈H|V 〉〈V |H〉 = 0 (1.20)
due to the fact that internal product 〈V |H〉 = 0 since the state are or-
thogonal. On the other hand when the operator M× is chosen we get a
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probability of measuring + when the original state is H given by
p
|H〉
× (+) = 〈H|+〉〈+|H〉 (1.21)
= 〈H|
( |H〉+ |V 〉√
2
)(〈H| − 〈V |√
2
)
|H〉 (1.22)
=
1
2
(〈H|H〉+ 〈H|V 〉) (〈H|H〉 − 〈H|V 〉) (1.23)
=
1
2
(1.24)
In the same way we obtain p
|H〉
× (−) = p|V 〉× (+) = p|V 〉× (−) = 12 . This show us
that if the qubit is prepared in a basis and we perform the measure in the
other basis the result we obtain is completely random, thus the measure
is giving no information at all. When two bases satisfy this property they
are called conjugate basis.
No-cloning theorem
Till now we have shown that the state of a qubit cannot be recovered with
a single measure and that the measure itself changes the state of the qubit.
The last possible thing we can think to do in order to recover the original
state of the qubit is to create many copies of the qubit prior the measure,
using a hypothetical cloning machine, and then perform different measures
using different basis on the various copies of the qubit. In this way it would
be possible to recover the coefficient α with the desired accuracy. It can
be demonstrated that also this eventuality is forbidden by the laws of the
quantum mechanics.
Theorem 1.4.1 (No-cloning theorem). It is impossible to build a machine
that operates unitary transformatons and is able to clone the generic state
of a qubit
1.5 Quantum cryptographic system
Similarly to a classical cryptographic system, the goal of a quantum cryp-
tographic system is to allow two parties – the transmitter is usually called
Alice (A) and the receiver Bob (B) – exchanging a message secretly over
an untrusted channel, thus preventing any eavesdropper – usually called
Eve (E) – to read or alter the message exchanged. To achieve this, beside
the classical channel, used to transmit the ciphertext, a quantum channel
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is employed to exchange the so called raw key, from which the uncondi-
tionally secure key will be obtained (Figure 1.3).
The leading idea in QKD is to exploit the intrinsic unpredictability of
a quantum measure to detect the presence of an intruder. In fact if an
eavesdropper tries to intercept the key, it needs to perform a measure over
the exchanged qubits that will disturb (randomizes) the quantum state
of them. If the exchanged qubits are prepared in some peculiar states, a
proper analysis on the error rate of the key can allow detecting the presence
of an intruder in a reliable manner.
Figure 1.3: Basic scheme of a quantum cryptographic system. Two parties
Alice (A) and Bob (B) use a quantum channel to share a raw key KQ. The
raw key is than processed to extract an unconditional secure key, which is
then used to encrypt the message x into the ciphertext y. The encrypted
message y is sent by A to B over the untrusted channel. An eavesdropper
E perform some measurments on both the channel trying to extract the
information x˜ and K˜ on the message and on the key respectively [10].
Ideally, if the system is able to generate a secret key with a sufficiently
high bit rate, the message encoding can be performed using the one-time-
pad protocol, leading so to a perfectly secure communication. On the other
hand, if the key is not as long as the message, it can be used to operate a
classical algorithm as AES. Although this second choice does not guarantee
an unconditional security, it can provide a much higher degree of security
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with respect a classical system, due to the fact that it will be possible
to change the secret key used in the classical algorithm very frequently –
indeed the key is continuously generated by the quantum protocol.
Two remarks have to be done. Firstly, we see that the quantum proto-
col is not used to encrypt the message but it is only employed to generate
the secret key, so that the name quantum key distribution well describes
the operation of the system. The second thing we must note is that the two
parties need to authenticate each other before been able to exchange a key,
otherwise a men-in-the-middle attack can be performed by the eavesdrop-
per. In other words if an authentication phase is not done, the eavesdrop-
per can pretend to be one of the two parties and engage a communication
with the other one. From this point of view the quantum protocol can be
regarded as a key expander protocol, since it is able to generate an infinite
long key beginning form a short pre-shared key.
1.6 The BB84 protocol
The first protocol for QKD was proposed by Bennet and Bressard in 1984
[11]. This protocol uses four different quantum states from two conjugate
bases – in the case of polarization encoded qubits the two bases can be
chosen as the H/V polarization basis (+) and the 45° diagonal +/- po-
larization basis (×) ({|H〉, |V 〉} and {|+〉, |−〉}) – for encoding the values
0 and 1 of a randomly generated raw key. As we will see, the use of the
conjugate basis will make impossible to Eve to perform measurements on
the quantum channel without being detected. We now describe in details
how this protocol works. An example of the operation of this protocol is
shown in Table 1.1.
Alice random bits 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
Alice random bases × + × × × + + ×
Transmitted polarization |+〉 |H〉 |+〉 |−〉 |−〉 |V 〉 |V 〉 |−〉
Bob random bases + + + × + × + ×
Raw Key 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
Sifted Key 1 0 1 0
Table 1.1: BB84 operation example.
1. Alice generate a random sequence of bits that forms the raw key.
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2. For every bit to be sent, Alice chooses at random one of the two
possible bases and encode the qubit according to Table 1.2. The
particular choice of the basis is stored for the post-processing phase.
Bit\Basis + ×
0 |H〉 |+〉
1 |V 〉 |−〉
Table 1.2: BB84 bit encoding lookup table
3. Bob on the other side, chooses at random one of the basis and mea-
sures the state of polarization of the incoming photon with the chosen
basis, obtaining so one of the two possible values 0 and 1.
4. Bob communicate to Alice through the classical channel which bits
it has detected, in fact due to the channel losses some photons can
have been lost.
5. In this phase, called key sifting, Alice and Bob publicly communicate
the choice made on the bases. When this choice coincides, the values
of the bit measured by Bob coincides with the one sent by Alice,
whilst if the two bases do not coincide the value that Bob got is
correct only half of the times and so the bit must be discarded. In
fact, since the bases are conjugate, when the wrong basis is chosen
to perform the measurement the result is completely random. At the
end of this process Alice and Bob share the so called sifted key – the
sifted key possessed by Alice and Bob are supposed to be equal, but
this is true only if the quantum channel does not introduce errors
and the eavesdropper has not tried to intercept the key.
6. At this point Alice and Bob need to check whether there was an
eavesdropper present. This can be established from the error rate
on the raw key, which is called Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER).
Alice and Bob reveal the same small portion of the raw key on the
public channel and they calculate the percent of bits that are not
equal. If the resulting QBER is higher than a specific threshold, to
assure the unconditional security of the key they must assume the
presence of an attacker (even though the high QBER can be caused
by errors introduced by the channel or by the optical components),
so that they have to discard the key and restart the procedure.
1.6 The BB84 protocol 17
7. If the QBER is low enough they can perform the information recon-
ciliation, that is a procedure of error correction with classical meth-
ods on the sifted key.
8. Finally they can perform the so called privacy amplification, that is a
mapping of the current key over a new key, which will be completely
uncorrelated from the piece of information possessed by Eve. This
operation is usually performed by using hash functions.
We note that Bob will choose the wrong basis 50% of the times, so that
only half of the received photons will give a useful bit. We can say that
the BB84 has an efficiency of the 50%.
1.6.1 Security
The security of the BB84 protocol has been proved considering many dif-
ferent type of attacks. In particular it has been proven that if the QBER
is lower than ≈ 11% the obtained key can be considered absolutely un-
conditional secure against any possible attack [12]. A less tight threshold
of ≈ 15% can guaranteed an unconditional secure key against less general
type of attacks, that nowadays are the only that can be realized [13]. We
now describe the simplest attack that can be performed by Eve, just to
give an idea on how the presence of Eve can be inferred from the QBER.
Intercept-and-resend attack
The simplest attack Eve can do is the so called intercept-and-resend attack
(which is nothing more than a man-in-the-middle attack). In this attack
Eve is assumed to be able to capture all the photons sent by Alice, and
measures the polarization of them. Since Eve does not know the basis
chosen by Alice the best she can do is to randomly perform the measure
on one of the two bases. If the photon was polarized H for example, and
Eve chooses the H/V basis, it will get the correct bit, whereas if she chooses
the +/- basis she will get the correct value only half of the times. At this
point Eve has to resend the photon to Bob and since she does not know
whether the result of the measure is correct or not, the best she can do is
to resend to Bob a photon with the same polarization of the one she has
measured. If the basis chosen by Eve was correct also the bit received by
Bob will be so and the presence of Eve will not be revealed, while if the
basis chosen was wrong there is a 50% probability that Bob will obtain
the same polarization of the original photon sent by Alice. Finally we can
say that the error introduced by Eve on the QBER will be obtained by
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multiplying the probability that Eve has chosen the wrong basis by the
probability that Bob has obtained the wrong value, leading to a 25% of
increase in the QBER.
1.7 The B92 protocol
In the 1992 Bennet introduced a variant of the BB84 protocol, which uses
only two non-orthogonal states of polarization. We now briefly describe
how this protocol works. An example of the operation of this protocol is
shown in Table 1.3.
Alice random bits 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
Transmitted polarization |V 〉 |+〉 |V 〉 |V 〉 |V 〉 |V 〉 |+〉 |+〉
Bob random directions |H〉 |H〉 |−〉 |−〉 |H〉 |−〉 |H〉 |−〉
Bob click X X X X
Raw Key 1 0 0 1
Sifted Key 1 0 0 1
Table 1.3: B92 operation example.
1. Alice generate a random sequence of bits that forms the raw key.
2. For every bit to be sent, Alice chooses at random one of the two
possible polarizations according to Table 1.4. The particular choice
of the polarization is stored for the post-processing phase.
Bit\Party Alice Bob
0 |V 〉 |−〉
1 |+〉 |H〉
Table 1.4: B92 bit encoding lookup table
3. Bob on the other side, chooses at random one of the other two di-
rections of polarization and measures the state of polarization of the
incoming photon along the chosen direction. In this protocol if Bob
measurement the polarization according with the choice of Alice it
has a 50% of probability of revealing the photon. In the other case,
when he measures the polarization in the wrong direction it won’t
reveal nothing with unitary probability.
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4. Bob communicate to Alice when it has revealed a photon. All the
bit values corresponding to the revealed bits will form the sifted key.
5. The protocol proceeds as in the case of BB84 with the information
reconciliation and privacy amplification phases.
In this protocol the efficiency is 25%. In fact Bob will measure in the
wrong direction 50% of the times as in the BB84, but here also when he
measures in the correct direction there is another 50% of probability of not
revealing the photon.
In this protocol when Eve performs an intercept-and-resend attack it
can still measure in all the four directions, so since the protocol uses only
two states she has a clear advantage. It can be shown that the presence of
Eve will increase the QBER of 12.5% (a derivation of this value is shown
in [10] sec. 3.3.2).
1.8 Comparison of the BB84 and B92 proto-
cols
The clear advantage of the B92 protocol is an easier implementation. In-
deed this protocol can be realized by using only two single photon detectors
and there will be the needing to prepare the photons in only two states of
polarization. This last aspect (as we will see in Chapter 4) will lead to a
great simplification in the implementation of the system.
The disadvantage of the B92 protocol is the lower efficiency, which
implies a doubling of the time needed to obtain the same amount of key
of an equivalent BB84 system or the need of a double frequency of the
transmitted photons.
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Chapter 2
Proof of concept of an
earth-satellite QKD system
In this chapter we firstly discuss the problems associated with the use of
a vertical earth-satellite quantum link. So we will introduce the Satel-
lite Laser Ranging (SLR) infrastructure we have used as an underlying
technology to build our system, referring particularly to the installation of
the Matera Laser Ranging Observatory (MLRO), located in Matera, Italy.
where the experiment was carried out [14]. We then present the results
obtained in the first two phases of the experiment where the team led by
Paolo Villoresi has proven the feasibility of exchanging a single photon
from a satellite to an earth station, while maintaining the state of polar-
ization. Finally we will present the last phase of the experiment, which aim
to realize a fully working QKD system able to exchange an unconditional
secure key between the satellite and the earth station.
2.1 Problems in the transmission of photons
over a vertical link
To properly create a fully working earth-satellite QKD system it is first
necessary to model and analyze a real space quantum link. Physically, one
has to deal with a free-space dynamic optical link through the atmosphere,
in which the transmitter and the receiver are in relative motion between
them. The main problems that arise when such link is used for quantum
communication purposes are the following:
• Effects due to atmospheric turbulence that causes attenuation ad
fluctuations in the signal received.
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• Background noise generated by sunlight, moonlight and every source
of photons that can be collected by the receiver.
• The relative motions between the transmitter and the receiver, which
is the main source of misalignment in the polarization references of
the transmitter and receiver.
• Non ideal optics that can cause depolarization, attenuation and dis-
tortion in the exchanged photons.
2.2 Satellite laser ranging infrastructure
To study and implement a quantum space link, a transmitter/receiver in
space is needed, so that a hosting satellite is required. Unfortunately, there
are still no satellites equipped with a transmitter or a receiver since building
and operating one is still a challenging task. However, recently some works
have been focused on the development of compact transceiver suited to
be housed on a satellite [15]. In the meanwhile we can take advantage
from the existing SLR network to solve this problem. This, indeed, is
the current easiest way to obtain a quantum space link using yet existing
facilities, which should – obviously – properly adapted and integrated with
the new instrumentations. In satellite laser ranging a global network of
earth stations measure the round trip time of ultra short pulses sent to the
satellites equipped with retro reflectors. This provides instantaneous range
measurements, with millimeters accuracy, which can be used to provide
careful measures of satellite orbits and for other geodetic purposes.
2.2.1 Laser ranging earth stations
A laser ranging earth station is usually provided with the following com-
ponents
• High-speed telescope, able to point and track the laser ranging satel-
lite, which normally orbiting in LEO (Low Earth Orbit) or MEO
(Medium Earth Orbit) range
• High energy pulsed laser
• Detector able to receive the weak retro-reflected laser pulses
• Pointing and tracking system
• Data logger system used for collecting the ranging data
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The complete specifications of the MLRO SLR system are reported in
Table 2.1.
Parameter Value
Telescope diameter 1.5 m
Laser pulse energy 100 mJ
Laser pulse repetition rate 10 Hz
Laser wavelength 532 nm
Beam divergence angle 45 µrad
Transmission optical efficiency 0.75
Receiving optical efficiency 0.39
Elevation 536.9 m
Telescope effective area 1.7662 m2
One-way atmospheric transmission Ta 0.14 - 0.89
One-way transmissivity of cirrus clouds Tc 0.31 - 1
Beam pointing error θ 14.6 - 32.4 µrad
Transmitter gain Gt 1.4 ·109 - 3.2 ·109
Table 2.1: Specifications of the Matera laser ranging observatory satellite
laser ranging system.
2.2.2 Laser ranging satellites
The laser ranging satellites are provided with Corner Cube Reflectors
(CCRs), which are able of reflecting the incident beam in a counter-parallel
direction, regardless of the angle of incidence. In Figure 2.1 are shown two
satellites used for laser ranging purposes, while in Table 2.2 is reported a
list of the satellites we consider suitable to be used in our experiment.
2.3 Previous works
2.3.1 Matera-1 Feasibility of single photon satellite
communications
The experimental demonstration of the feasibility of single photon ex-
change between a satellite and a ground receiver has been already demon-
strated by Paolo Villoresi, Cesare Barbieri et al. [2] in the first phase of
the Matera experiment. In particular in this work they simulated a sin-
gle photon source on a satellite using the retro-reflection of a weak laser
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Satellite Altitude (Km) Retroreflectors type
Ajisai 1 490 uncoated
Beacon-C 927 metal-coated
Blits 832 metal-coated
Cryosat-2 720 metal-coated
Etalon 1-2 19 120 metal-coated
Giove A-B 23 916 metal-coated
Glonass 102-109-110 19 100 metal-coated
Glonass 115 19 100 uncoated
Goce 295 uncoated
Grace A-B 485 uncoated
HY2A 961 metal-coated
Jason 1-2 1 366 metal-coated
Lageos 1-2 5 700 uncoated
Lares 1 500 uncoated
Larets 485 uncoated
Starlette 815 uncoated
Stella 815 uncoated
Tandem-X 514 metal-coated
TerraSAR-X 514 metal-coated
Table 2.2: List of the satellites suitable to perform our experiment. For
each satellite the altitude and the type of coating of the mounted corner
cube reflectors are reported.
pulse from a laser ranging satellite (Figure 2.2). To achieve the single pho-
ton condition they set the experimental parameters in order to make the
mean number of photons per laser pulse in the downward link much less
than unity. To detect the incoming single-photons they used an Avalanche
Photo Detector (APD) and to discriminate the useful photons from the
background noise they filtered the incoming photons with respect to di-
rection, wavelength and polarization. Moreover a precise time tagger were
used to take into account only the photons detected in some predefined
time bins, in such a way to filter the background noise also in time.
The statistical analysis of the times of arrival of the single-photons
shows that there was a returning rate of 5 count per second (cps), corre-
sponding to a probability of detecting a photon per emitted laser pulse of
3 × 10−4. The rate of emitted photons from the satellite directed to the
FOV of the ground telescope taking into account the detection efficiency
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Figure 2.1: Satellites equipped with corner cube reflectors.
and the losses in the detection path can be estimated in 3 × 10−2, thus
confirming that the experiment was taken in a condition of single-photon
regime.
This experiment proved that it would be possible to create a quantum
communication system in space. Further, in the paper it has also been
shown that placing the photon source on the satellite is a better choice
with respect other proposed schemes that assume the transmitter to be
on the ground. Unfortunately in this experiment it wasn’t possible to im-
plement a fully working QKD system because of two main issues. The
first is the high loss introduced by the two-way channel and by the detec-
tion instrumentation, which was measured in -157 dB for a LEO satellite.
The second is that it was not possible to maintain the polarization of the
transmitted photons.
2.3.2 Matera-2 Study of the transformation of polar-
ization of a quantum channel in space
In the phase two of the experiment an accurate study on the preservation
of the polarization was carried out. Firstly the team of Paolo Villoresi
has undertaken an accurate study on how the differently coated CCRs
(Figure 2.3) change the state of polarization of the light when this is back-
reflected [16]. What they found is that the uncoated CCRs depolarize the
reflected light destroying so the information stored in the photon. On the
other hand the metal-coated CCRs are able to keep the state of polarization
up to rotations in its direction, which can be easily pre-compensated with
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Figure 2.2: The scheme of the satellite single-photon link. A fraction of the
beam in the uplink path irradiates the satellite. The corner cubes on the
satellite retro-reflect back to the Earth a small portion of the photons in the
laser pulse (downlink) and the gathered portion, according to the receiver
FOV. This, according to the experimental parameters, is the single-photon
channel.
a series of a quarter-waveplate and a half-waveplate. Then they built a
four channel Stokes polarimeter [17], which has been integrated in the
MLRO system in order to estimate how the quantum channel alters the
state of polarization of the transmitted photons. The experiment leads
to positive results for some specific satellites. Indeed it was possible to
transmit and receive a pulse of light while maintaining its polarization as
shown in Figure 2.4.
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(a) Aluminium coated CCR (b) Uncoated CCR
Figure 2.3: Example of corner cube reflectors
2.4 Matera-3 A complete QKD implementa-
tion
The aim of the third phase of the Matera experiment is the implemen-
tation of a fully working QKD system on a satellite-Earth downlink, by
merging the results of the previous phases of the experiment on single
photon transmission and preservation of light polarization through atmo-
sphere. The system implemented at the MLRO station aims to simulate a
single photon source on the satellite by shooting a polarized laser pulse to-
wards a satellite equipped with retro-reflectors and exploiting the reflected
pulse as a single-photon source.
To accomplish this goal a sequence of qubits is generated exploiting
a laser able to generate pulses with 100 ps Full Width Half Maximum
(FWHM) at a repetition rate of 100 MHz. These are polarized according
to the B92 protocol and sent between two consecutive 10 Hz laser ranging
pulses, referred here as START signal (Figure 2.5). When the telescope
tracks a satellite, the MLRO laser pulses are back-reflected to the station,
where they are recorded, thus producing a STOP signal. Both START
and STOP signals are recorded by a time-tagger as a time reference for
the outgoing and returning qubits.
2.4.1 Experiment setup
The complete experimental setup is reported in Figure 2.6. On the sender
side (Alice) the 100MHz laser pulses are firstly converted from 1064 nm
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Figure 2.4: Intensity levels measured in the four channels of the polarimeter
(H, V, +, R, in the order) for a +45° polarized pulse received from the
satellite. The intensity levels of the H and V channels are equal, thus
indicating the fact that the measured polarization state is +45°. To be
noted that the + and R channels are subjected to a higher loss due to
the presence of a second beam splitter. Moreover the APDs used for these
channel were not working well during the experiment. This can explain
the fact that there was not signal measured in them.
to 532 nm via a second harmonic generator (SHG) crystal, therefore are
corrected for any polarization ellipticity by a λ/2 and a λ/4 retarder and
given as input to a polarization modulator, which generates the two po-
larization states, vertical and circular left-handed. The signal produced
are sent to the caudé optical path via a couple of beam splitters (BSs).
On the receiver side (Bob) a primary BS divides the incoming photons
between two branches: the one measuring the horizontal polarization uses
a polarizing beam splitter (PBS) followed by a single photon photomulti-
plier tube (PMT) (Hamamatsu H7360-2), while on the other branch the
circular right-handed polarization is measured with a λ/4 retarder followed
by a PBS and a PMT. An additional λ/2 retarder has been added to this
branch to correct for any ellipticity that may arise in the photon path.
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Figure 2.5: Time sequence of the START signals, occurring each 100ms,
and qubit signals, which are separated in time by 10 ns.
2.4.2 Implementation issues analysis
Differently from a real QKD system, in this setup both the transmitter
and the receiver are in the ground station. Because of this some peculiar
implementation problems, that will not be present in a real implemen-
tation, arise. The first problem is due to the fact that the transmitter
and the receiver share the same optical path and that the whole system
must be integrated in the laser ranging architecture. Because of this, two
beam splitters are used leading so to a 75% loss both in transmission and
in reception. The transmission problem can be partially compensated by
increasing the optical power of the laser to a level necessary to assure a
single photon source on the satellite, whilst the receiving loss cannot be
avoided.
Beside this we noted that the presence of the beam splitter that com-
bines the transmitter optical path with the receiver one causes a strong
scattering of the transmitter pulses that will end in the receiver PMT, thus
causing a great increase of the background noise. To solve this problem we
decided not to transmit continuously as a real QKD system is expected to
do, but we opt for a slotted approach, in which in the first portion of time
only the transmitter is active while in the second one only the receiver is
so. To achieve this, two fast shutters have been used. One shutter has
been placed right before the SHG crystal while the second in front of the
receiver PMT.
Another problem that arises from the integration with the laser ranging
system is that the laser used to measure the distance of the satellite and
to track it, is extremely energetic. If such high powerful pulse would be
captured by the PMT, it will instantly cause the failure of the component.
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For this reason the receiver shutter will also be used to protect the PMT
when both the transmitted and the received pulse are expected to come.
The specific shutter scheduling protocol will be explained in details in
Chapter 5.
The last problem that should be faced when dealing with a vertical
quantum link is the high losses regime in which the QKD system has
to operate. In fact the laser beam propagating trough the turbulent at-
mosphere is subjected to many different effects such as beam wandering,
intensity fluctuations (scintillation), beam spreading, etc. These effects
are mainly generated by small variations (≈ 10−6) in the refractive index
of the atmosphere. These variations are caused by small changes in the
temperature (<1°C) which can give rise to random changes in the wind
speed generating whirling. Each whirl can be modeled as a small lens. The
cumulative effect of these lenses can redirect the beam, and possibly cause
variations in intensity through interference phenomena.
We should note that if the losses are too high and since the average
number of photons that leaves the satellite must be unitary (to guarantee
the single photon conditions), it will be impossible to receive a sufficient
number of photons to generate the key. To address this problem the only
action that can be undertaken is increasing the repetition rate of the laser
source.
2.4.3 Link Budget
Because of the presence of high losses in the quantum channel, an accu-
rate analysis of the link budget need to be done in order to verify that the
QKD system will be able to work properly. Here we present an estima-
tion of practical losses considering a MEO satellite. The key experimental
parameters are shown in Table 2.3.
The relevant parameters for the link budget analysis are the following.
The pulse energy E is 0.2 nJ (@532 nm); S, the photon number per joule,
is 2.67 · 1018; As, the effective area of satellite corner retro-reflector, is 0.30
m2 for a specific considered satellite; Ar = 1.7671 m
2; Kt, the efficiency of
transmission system, is 0.2; Kr, the efficiency of optical receiving system,
is 0.2, including a 0.8 factor that account for the receiving telescope and a
0.2 factor to account the two beam splitters; T , the one-way atmospheric
transmission, is 0.65 (@532 nm); η, the quantum efficiency of receiving
detection device, is 0.01; α is 0.05 and represent the attenuation factor
(including the influence of satellite retro-reflector efficiency, atmospheric
jitter and turbulence); L, the satellite distance in km for a MEO satellite,
is2000; θt, the laser beam divergence angle, is 50 µrad; θs, the diffraction
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Parameters Symbol Values
Laser repition rate ∆ 100 MHz
Single pulse energy E 0.2 nJ
Photon number per joule S 2.67 · 1018
Satellite distance L 20000 km
Geometrical efficency of transmission 4As
pi θ2
t
L2
3.82 · 10−7
Geometrical efficency of receiving 4Ar
pi θ2
s
L2
6.25 · 10−6
Efficiency of transmission system Kt 0.2
Receiving system effiicency Kr 0.2
Quantum detection efficiency η 0.01
One-way atmospheric transmission T 0.6
Attenuation factor α 0.05
Table 2.3: Link budget parameters.
angle of satellite retro-reflector, is 30 µrad.
According to the given parameters we could calculate the one-way chan-
nel attenuation from the ground station to the satellite, which result in
ηup =
4AsKt T α
π R2 θ2t
= 2.40 · 10−9 ≃ 90dB (2.1)
So the number of photons reflected from the satellite to the earth station
is
N0 = E · S · ηup ≃ 1.23 (2.2)
From the other side, the attenuation from the satellite to the earth station
is
ηdown =
4ArKr T η
π R2 θ2s
= 7.8 · 10−8 ≃ 80dB (2.3)
Therefore, the theoretical number of photons per pulse detected at the
receiver is
N = N0 · ηdown ≃ 4.9 · 10−7 (2.4)
From the calculations above, and considering the fact that we choose a
very distant satellite to carry out the experiment, we have estimated that
the satellite can be considered a single-photon source. We should note
that due the high losses present, small variations in any of the parameters
can lead to great variations in the calculated loss coefficients. From these
coefficients and the parameters of the laser we use to transmit the photons,
we have estimated to be able to generate a key with a rate of about 10 Hz.
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Figure 2.6: Schematic of the optical setup installed at the MLRO. The Al-
ice transmitting module generates the V-L states, while the Bob receiving
module measures the received photons on the H-R basis.
Chapter 3
Polarization Modulator
A crucial component of the transmitter of our QKD system is the polar-
ization modulator. This is a wave retarder (or waveplate) that can change
the state of polarization of a light wave according to an external applied
voltage. In the following sections we will introduce the optics of anisotropic
medium and the electro-optic effect following the treatment made in [18],
and we will show how an anisotropic crystal, in particular the lithium nio-
bate crystal (LiNbO3), can be used to build an electronically controlled
wave retarder.
3.1 Optics of anisotropic crystal
3.1.1 Permittivity tensor
The dielectric properties of a linear anisotropic dielectric medium, as a
crystal, are completely described by a quantity called electric permittivity
tensor ǫ, which is a tensor of second rank
ǫ =

ǫ11 ǫ12 ǫ13ǫ21 ǫ22 ǫ23
ǫ31 ǫ32 ǫ33

 (3.1)
This quantity relates the electric field vector E to the displacement vector
D through the so called material equation
D = ǫE (3.2)
For most dielectric media, the electric permittivity tensor is symmetric,
i.e., ǫij = ǫji. In particular this is true when the medium is non-magnetic
and no magnetic field is applied to it. When this symmetry is present,
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the medium is characterized by only six independent numbers for an arbi-
trary coordinate system. We recall that, in a given coordinate system, a
symmetric second-rank tensor is represented geometrically by a quadratic
surface, i.e., an ellipsoid that is said quadratic representation. Changing
the coordinate system yields a different set of nine numbers, and a surface
rotated respect the coordinate system but unchanged in its shape.
3.1.2 Crystal principal axes
It is always possible to choose a coordinate system such that all the off-
diagonal coefficients of the permittivity tensor vanish, so that (3.2) simpli-
fies to
D1 = ǫ1E1, D2 = ǫ2E2, D3 = ǫ3E3 (3.3)
where ǫ1 = ǫ11, ǫ2 = ǫ22, ǫ3 = ǫ33. In this situation the components of
the electric field vector E and the ones of the displacement vector D are
parallel along these particular directions. This coordinate system defines
the principal axes of the crystal. The permittivities ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3 correspond to
the so called principal refractive indexes
n1 =
√
ǫ1
ǫ0
, n2 =
√
ǫ2
ǫ0
, n3 =
√
ǫ3
ǫ0
(3.4)
Crystals in which the three principal refractive indexes are different are
termed biaxial, while crystals that present some kind of symmetries that
lead to have two principal refractive indexes equal, are called uniaxial. In
this case, the indexes are usually denoted as n1 = n2 = no and n3 = ne,
and are known as the ordinary and extraordinary refractive indexes. The
crystal is said to be positive uniaxial if ne > no, and negative uniaxial if
ne < no. The z axis of a uniaxial crystal is called the optic axis.
3.1.3 Index ellipsoid
The index ellipsoid is the quadratic representation of the electric imper-
meability tensor η = ǫ0ǫ
−1. When the principal axes coordinate system is
used, the index ellipsoid is given by
x21
n21
+
x22
n22
+
x23
n23
= 1 (3.5)
with axes of half-length n1, n2 and n3. The optical properties of the crys-
tal (the directions of the principal axes and the values of the principal
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refractive indexes) are therefore completely described by the index ellip-
soid (Figure 3.1). For a uniaxial crystal, the index ellipsoid reduces to an
ellipsoid of revolution.
Figure 3.1: The index ellipsoid. The coordinates system axes (x1, x2, x3)
are the principal axes while (n1, n2, n3) are the principal refractive indexes
of the crystal.
3.1.4 Propagation along a principal axes
Let consider a crystal whose principal axes coincide with a coordinate
system x− y − z and a light wave travelling along the z axis. If this wave
is linearly polarized along one of the other two principal axes, it will travel
inside the crystal without changing its polarization because the electric
field has only one component that is aligned with a principal axis so that
the displacement vector is Di = ǫiEi, with i = 1 or 2. The Maxwell’s
equations provides a velocity of light in the crystal equal to c0/ni, with
i = 1 or 2. Thus, the normal modes for propagation in the z direction are
linearly polarized waves in the x and y directions.
When we consider a light wave travelling in the z direction and linearly
polarized along an arbitrary direction in the x − y plane, we can regard
it as the sum of the two normal modes. This two waves travel with dif-
ferent phase velocities, c0/n1 and c0/n2 respectively, in such a way they
undergo different phase shifts, ϕx = n1k0d and ϕy = n2k0d respectively,
after propagating the same distance d inside the crystal. Their relative
phase retardation is thus ϕ = ϕy − ϕx = (n2 − n1)k0d. The recombina-
tion of the two components yields, in the general case, to an elliptically
polarized wave.
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3.2 Wave retarder
From the properties shown above we understand that an anisotropic crystal
can be used to build optical components that can change the state of
polarization of an optical wave. This optical component is called wave
retarder (sometimes called waveplate). This device is characterized by its
fast and slow axes and by its retardation
ϕ = 2π(n2 − n1) d
λ0
(3.6)
Wave retarders are often built from anisotropic crystals in the form of
plates, which thickness d determines the relative phase difference ϕ. In
particular, the waveplate retards the component of the incident light wave
parallel to the slow axis of the crystal by ϕ respect the component par-
allel to the fast axis. In Figure 3.2 it’s possible to see how a light wave
travelling inside a wave retarder undergoes a progressive retardation of one
component with respect the other, thus leading to a change in the state of
polarization of the wave. To be noted, as we can see from (3.6), that the
phase shift is dependent on the wavelength λ0 of the incident light wave.
This implies that a specific wave retarder can only be used to retard a light
wave of a specific wavelength.
Two particular kinds of wave retarders are the quarter-wave retarder
and the half-wave retarder. These two devices are of particular interest
because using them in series it is possible to obtain any state of polarization
beginning from an arbitrary one.
Quarter wave retarder
A quarter-wave retarder is a plate that introduce a phase shift of λ/4
between the two normal modes. If the incident wave is linearly polarized
and travels along one of the optic axes of the crystal forming an angle of
45° with the other two axes (or the only other for uniaxial crystal) the
out coming wave will be circularly polarized. If the angle is not 45° the r
will have a generic elliptical polarization. This happens because the two
components of the incident wave posses the same magnitude only when
the angle is 45° (Figure 3.3). In Figure 3.4 is reported the Poincare sphere
corresponding to a quarter-wave retarder.
Half wave retarder
A half-wave retarder is similar to the quarter-wave retarder but it intro-
duces a phase shift of λ/2 between the two normal modes. This device
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Figure 3.2: The progressive phase shift inside the crystal change the state
of polarization of a linearly polarized wave, which angle of polarization is
45° with respect the optic axis, to its orthogonal state of polarization. In
this case the crystal act as a half-wave retarder.
is used to change the polarization of a light wave from a specific state of
linear polarization to a generic other linear state of polarization. A linearly
polarized wave entering the crystal with an angle θ respect the optic axis
will exit with an angle of polarization of −θ respect the axis, so that it
undergoes a total rotation of 2θ. In Figure 3.4 is reported the Poincare
sphere corresponding to a half-wave retarder.
3.3 Electro-optic effect
Certain transparent materials change their optical properties when sub-
jected to an electric field. This is a result of forces that distort the po-
sitions, orientations, or shapes of the molecules constituting the material.
The electro-optic effect is a change in the refractive index that results
from the application of a steady or low-frequency electric field. An electric
field applied to an anisotropic optical material modifies the refractive in-
dexes of this material and thereby the effect that it has on polarized light
passing through it. This property can be exploited to implement many
types of electronically controllable optic components, including wave re-
tarders. There are two kind of electro-optic effects, namely the Pockel’s
effect and the Kerr effect. The first one is a linear effect while the second
is a quadratic effect. In the next section we will focus our analysis on the
Pockel’s effect.
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Figure 3.3: The quarter-waveplate retards the the component of the in-
cident light wave parallel to the slow axis of the crystal by λ/4 respect
the component parallel to the fast axis, changing so the polarization from
linear to circular.
3.3.1 Pockel’s electro-optic effect
When a steady electric field E with components (E1, E2, E3) is applied to
a crystal, the elements of the impermeability tensor η are modified and
so also the index ellipsoid. To determine the new index ellipsoid it is
sufficient to know the new coefficients ηij(E), which are functions of the
applied electric field. Each of the functions ηij(E) may be expanded in a
Taylor series about E = 0
ηij(E) = ηij +
∑
k
rijkEk i, j, k = 1, 2, 3 (3.7)
where ηij = ηij(0), rijk = ∂ηij/∂Ek, and the derivatives are evaluated at
E = 0. The coefficients rijk are known as the linear electro-optic (Pockel’s)
coefficients. They are 33 = 27 coefficients and they form a tensor of third
rank. Because η is symmetric (ηij = ηji), r is invariant under permutation
of the indexes i and j, i.e., rijk = rjik. Because of this, the nine combi-
nations of the indexes i and j generate six instead of nine independent
elements. Consequently, r has 6 × 3 independent elements. It is conven-
tional to rename the pair of indexes (i, j), i, j = 1, 2, 3, as a single index
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Figure 3.4: Poincare sphere of a quarter-wave retarder (left) and a half-
wave retarder (right). The blue line shows all the polarization states reach-
able from a state of linear polarization using the waveplate.
I = 1, 2, . . . , 6 in accordance with Table 3.1. The symmetry of the crys-
tal adds more constraints to the entries of r. Some entries must be zero
and others must be equal, or equal in magnitude and opposite in sign, or
related by some other rule.
j \ i 1 2 3
1 1 6 5
2 6 2 4
3 5 4 3
Table 3.1: Lookup table for the index I that represents the pair of indexes
(i,j) of the linear optic coefficient rijk
Procedure to get the modified index ellipsoid To determine the
optical properties of an anisotropic crystal exhibiting the Pockels effect in
the presence of an electric field the following procedure is used
1. Find the principal axes and principal refractive indexes n1, n2, and
n3 in the absence of E.
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2. Determine the elements of the new impermeability tensor
ηij(E) = ηij(0) +
∑
k
rijkEk (3.8)
where ηij(0) is a diagonal matrix with elements 1/n
2
1, 1/n
2
2, 1/n
2
3.
3. Write the equation for the modified index ellipsoid∑
i,j
ηij(E)xixj = 1 (3.9)
4. Determine the principal axes of the modified index ellipsoid by diag-
onalization, and find the corresponding principal refractive indexes
n1(E), n2(E), n3(E).
5. Given the direction of light propagation, find the normal modes and
their associated refractive indexes from this index ellipsoid.
3.4 Lithium Niobate Crystal (LiNbO3)
Lithium niobate is a colorless solid insoluble in water. It has a trigonal
crystal system, and displays ferroelectricity, Pockels effect, piezoelectric ef-
fect, photoelasticity and nonlinear optical polarizability. Lithium niobate
has negative uniaxial birefringence which depends slightly on the temper-
ature. It is transparent for wavelengths between 350 and 5200 nm.
The linear optics coefficients matrix r takes the following form
r =


0 −r22 r13
0 −r22 r13
0 0 −r33
0 −r51 0
r51 0 0
−r22 0 0


(3.10)
The ordinary and extraordinary refractive index is a function of the wave-
length of the incident light. The relation between these two quantities is
governed by the Sellmeier equation
n2o = 2.3920 +
2.5112λ2
λ2 − (0.217)2 +
7.1333λ2
λ2 − (16.502)2 (3.11)
n2e = 2.3247 +
2.2564λ2
λ2 − (0.210)2 +
14.503λ2
λ2 − (25.915)2 (3.12)
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where λ is in µm. For a light wave whose wavelength is 532 nm, as in our
case, the corresponding ordinary and extraordinary indexes are 2.323 and
2.234 respectively.
When we apply an electric field along the optic axis of a LiNbO3 crystal,
i.e., E = (0, 0, E), the modified index ellipsoid is readily shown to be given
by
(
1
n2o
+ r13E
)(
x21 + x
2
2
)
+
(
1
n2e
+ r33E
)
+ x23 = 1 (3.13)
This is an ellipsoid of revolution whose principal axes don’t change when
the electric field is applied (Figure 3.5). The ordinary and extraordinary
indexes, no(E) and ne(E), are related to the electric field E as
1
n2o(E)
=
1
n2o
+ r13E (3.14)
1
n2e(E)
=
1
n2e
+ r33E (3.15)
Because the terms r13E and r33E are small the two equations above can
be approximated by
no(E) = no − 1
2
n3or13E (3.16)
ne(E) = ne − 1
2
n3er33E (3.17)
where we have used the approximation
√
(1 + ∆) ≈ 1
2
∆ valid for |∆| ≪ 1.
3.5 LiNbO3 polarization modulator
A crystal that exhibits the Pockel’s effect such as a LiNbO3 crystal can
be used to build an electrically controlled wave retarder. In fact after a
propagation of distance L, the two modes of a light wave undergo a relative
phase retardation given by
ϕ = 2π [no(E)− ne(E)] L
λ0
(3.18)
= 2π
[
(no − ne)− 1
2
(
r13n
3
o − r33n3e
)
E
]
L
λ0
(3.19)
so that applying the electric field it’s possible to modify the difference
between the ordinary and extraordinary refractive index in accordance
42 Polarization Modulator
Figure 3.5: Modified index ellipsoid of a LiNbO3 crystal resulting from the
application of a steady electric field along the direction of the optic axis.
To be noted that the LiNbO3 is negative uniaxial, so that the ellipsoid in
figure should be squeezed rather than stretched.
with (3.16) (3.17). If E is obtained by applying a voltage V between two
surfaces of the medium separated by a distance d, (3.18) can be written in
compact form as
ϕ = ϕ0 − π V
Vpi
(3.20)
where ϕ = 2π [no − ne]L/λ0 is the phase retardation in the absence of the
electric field and
Vpi =
d
L
λ0
r33n3e − r13n3o
(3.21)
is the so called half-wave voltage, which is the voltage necessary to obtain
a phase retardation of π.
As we can see from (3.21), there is a linear relation between the optical
phase shift and the voltage. One can therefore modulate the phase of an
optical wave by varying the voltage V that is applied across a material
through which the light passes.
The parameter Vpi depends on the crystal intrinsic properties, n and
r, on the wavelength λ0 and on the aspect ratio d/L of the crystal. The
refraction indexes no and ne are also dependent on the wavelength. More-
over, the parameter r is dependent on the direction of propagation and on
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the direction of the applied field since the crystal is anisotropic.
The aspect ratio is an important parameter, in fact the choice on the
direction where to apply the external electric field leads to very different
values of Vpi. We can distinguish two main types of polarization modulator:
longitudinal and transverse modulators.
Figure 3.6: Longitudinal modulators with different kind of electrodes (a)
and a transverse modulator (b).
3.5.1 Logitudinal Modulator
In longitudinal modulators the external electric field is applied in a direc-
tion parallel to the one of the propagation of the light. In this case two ring
shaped electrodes are applied at the extremity of the crystal in such a way
that when a voltage is applied to them an electric field appeares along the
crystal. In this case the ratio between the distance of the two electrodes d
and the distance that the light travels in the crystal L is unitary. The Vpi
voltage is usually in the order of some kV and since the aspect ratio can’t
be altered it is not possible to lower this value.
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3.5.2 Transverse Modulator
In transverse modulator the external electric field is applied in a direction
perpendicular to the one of the propagation of the light. The two elec-
trodes are built on the top and on he bottom of the crystal, and the light
travels between them. With this configuration it is possible to reduce d
and increase L in order to lower Vpi up to an order of magnitude.
Considering a 532 nm light wave travelling in a LiNbO3 crystal, we have
that the parameters needed to compute Vpi are no = 2.323, ne = 2.243 given
by (3.11) (3.12), r13 = 9.6pm/V and r33 = 30.9pm/V . The corresponding
half-wave-voltage is Vpi = 2.37
(
d
L
)
kV . An aspect ratio of 1/10 leads to
Vpi = 237 V , which is significantly lower than the half-wave voltage for a
longitudinal modulator.
3.5.3 Integrated modulator
Electro-optic modulators can also be constructed as integrated-optical de-
vices. These devices operate at higher speeds and lower voltages than bulk
devices. An optical waveguide is fabricated in an electro-optic substrate of
LiNbO3 by indiffusing a material such as titanium to increase the refrac-
tive index. The electric field is applied to the waveguide using electrodes.
Because the configuration is transverse and the width of the waveguide is
much smaller than its length (d ≪ L), the half-wave voltage can be as
small as a few volts. These modulators can operate at speeds that ex-
ceed 100 GHz. Light can be conveniently coupled into, and out of, the
modulator by the use of optical fibers.
3.5.4 Bandwidth limiting factors
The speed at which an electro-optic modulator operates is limited by the
transit time of the light through the material. If the electric field E(t)
varies significantly within the light transit time T , the travelling optical
wave will be subjected to different electric fields as it traverses the crystal.
The modulated phase at a given time t will then be proportional to the
average electric field E(t) at times from t−T to t. As a result, the transit-
time-limited modulation bandwidth is ≈ 1/T .
Another important limiting factor is the fact that the two electrodes
form a capacitive load, which should be properly driven from an external
electronic driver to achieve fast operating times of the modulator. We will
discuss about this in the next chapter.
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Figure 3.7: Integrated transverse polarization modulator.
3.6 Thorlabs EO-AM-NR-C4 modulator
The thorlabs EO-AM-NR-C4 modulator consists of two lithium niobate
crystals packaged in a compact housing with an RF input connector (Fig-
ure 3.8). Given that the LiNbO3 presents a static temperature-dependent
birefringence, this implies that it induce a polarization change in the light
travelling through it also when no electric field is applied. Since the bire-
fringence is temperature-dependent it’s not sufficient to apply a bias volt-
age in order prevent the crystal to modify the polarization, because a small
variation of the temperature will reintroduce this change. To reduce this
deleterious effect, two LiNbO3 crystals are packaged together with the re-
spective principal axes rotated by 90° with respect each other. Thus the
temperature dependent static birefringence in the first crystal is canceled
by the temperature dependent static birefringence in the second. In this
manner, the temperature sensitivity of the modulator is generally less than
1 mrad/K [19].
The half-wave voltage, which general formula is given in (3.21), for this
particular modulator is given by the following simplified formula
Vpi = 0.361λ− 23.844 (3.22)
where λ is the wavelength in nm.
The LiNbO3 presents photorefractivity: if a high energy optical beam
hits the crystal, the spatial distributions of the charge can be altered lead-
ing to an inhomogeneous distribution of the charges that generate an elec-
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tric field pattern inside the crystal. This internal electric field is able to
modulate the local refractive index of the material by virtue of the Pockels
electro-optic effect. While this effect is desiderable in some application,
e.g. holograms forming, it should be considered a deleterious effect when
the crystal is used as wave retarder. The crystal in the Thorlabs modulator
is MgO-doped to increase the resistance to photorefractive damage. All
the specifications of this modulator are reported in Table 3.2.
Specification Description
Modulator crystal MgO-Doped Lithium Niobate (LiNbO3)
Wavelength range 400 to 600 nm
Clear aperture 2 mm diameter
Halfwave voltage Vpi 168 V @ 532 nm
Bandwidth 100 MHz
Optic axis orientation 45°
Extinction ratio > 10 dB
Input capacitance 14 pF (typical)
Maximum optical power density 2 W/mm2 @ 532 nm
Input connector SMA female
Table 3.2: Thorlabs EO-AM-NR-C4 polarization modulator specifications
Figure 3.8: Thorlabs EO-AM-NR-C4 LiNbO3 polarization modulator.
The 2mm hole in the right-lower part of the housing is the beam entrance.
An SMA input connector allows connecting an external high-voltage driver
needed to operate the modulator.
Chapter 4
Development of a high voltage
driver
As we have seen in the previous chapter to be able to change the state of
polarization of a light wave using the LiNbO3 polarization modulator, it
is necessary to apply to it a voltage proportional to change in polarization
we want to obtain. To apply this voltage a proper electronic driver is re-
quired. Due to the high voltage involved and the short switching times
requested for this application, it is necessary to care about different im-
plementation aspects to obtain a good optical output signal. Considering
the B92 protocol, that is the quantum communication protocol we have
used in our systems, we only need to change the polarization between two
states belonging to two conjugate bases. A smart choice of these two states
would the one of choosing one state corresponding to a linear polarization
(V) and the other state corresponding to a circular polarization (L). In
this way we minimize the maximum voltage that should be applied to the
modulator. In our case, we can extract from the modulator a state V with
0 V applied to it and a state L with Vpi/2 = 84 V . As we will see, lowering
the maximum voltage is a great advantage in the implementation of the
driver.
In the rest of this chapter we will present two simple designs of driver
for the polarization modulator, which aim to provide a good shaped high
voltage output needed to obtain a good polarization of the transmitted
photons.
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4.1 Considerations on polarization errors
To correctly polarize the laser pulse in one of the two possible states, when
the pulse transits through the modulator the voltage applied to it must
be perfectly steady in one of the two allowed levels: 0 or Vpi/2. If the
voltage is different from 0 or Vpi/2, the light pulse will assume a state of
polarization that is in general elliptical. Such polarized photons has a non
zero probability to be detected at the receiver also when the orthogonal
polarization state (respect the one the photon is expected to have) is chosen
to perform the measurement. This phenomena leads to an increase of the
QBER on the sifted key.
To evaluate how a state of polarization if far from the optimal, we can
measure the polarization of this state in a basis that encompass the state
of optimal polarization and its orthogonal state, and then we calculate the
visibility of the state. The visibility is defined as
V = IMAX − IMIN
IMAX + IMIN
(4.1)
where IMAX is the optical intensity measured in the direction parallel to
the one of the optimal state while IMIN is the optical intensity measured
in the orthogonal direction. We note that 0 ≤ V ≤ 1. The lower is the
visibility obtained the worse will be the state of polarization respect to
the optimal one. As example, if we want to evaluate the quality of the
polarization of a laser that is supposed to be left circularly polarized, we
should measure its intensity in the L/R basis and calculate the visibility.
It can be shown that for the B92 protocol the QBER increment due to
polarization errors is equal to two times the visibility, that is
∆QBER = 2× V (4.2)
Because of this it is important to correctly drive the modulator so it can
produce good polarized photons, in order to keep the QBER under the
threshold that guarantees an unconditionally secure key.
4.2 Driver requirements
The laser source we have used in our setup produce a pulse train with a
repetition rate of 100 MHz, where every pulse has a FWHM of 80 fs. To
best exploit the high repetition rate of our laser, every single pulse of light
should correspond to a single bit of the random generated raw key and
so should be modulated independently on the others. In this situation,
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considering the worst case where every bit of the key is different from
the previous one (that is a key on the form of {10101010101 · · · }), the
voltage applied to the modulator should be switched from zero to Vpi/2 and
vice versa every 10 ns, which corresponds to a switching frequency of 50
MHz (Figure 4.1). Achieving this high switching frequency with such high
voltage is still a challenge due to the problems shown in the next section.
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Figure 4.1: The time evolution of the modulation is shown for the ideal case
where each pulse (in green) of the train will be modulated independently
on the other. The red curve represents the logical signal that pilots the
driver; the blue curve represents the effective output voltage of the driver.
A way to modulate the polarization with such high switching frequency
would be to use an integrated polarization modulator, which can reach
GHz switching frequency and can be modulated with very low voltages.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to use this kind of modulator in our
setup because of the high losses resulting when coupling the free-space
laser with the optical fiber in the input of the modulator. Because of this
the solution we have adopted is to group n pulses of the laser together,
and perform the modulation on the group of pulses.
The other requirement the driver should guarantee is to reach a steady
state before the light pulse transit. Even when the photons are modu-
lated in group this requirement requires that the rising and falling time
(switching time) of the driver voltage must be not longer than 10 ns. If
the switching time is greater than this value, the first photons of the group
will undergo a generic elliptical polarization, leading so to an increase in
the QBER. This non-ideal scenario is shown in Figure 4.2.
From Table 3.2 we see that the modulator we want to drive can be
regarded as a pure capacitive load with an equivalent capacity of 14 pF.
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Figure 4.2: The time evolution of the modulation is shown for the non-
ideal case where a group of pulses are modulated together. The first pulses
of the group will undergo a wrong polarization because the voltage on the
modulator has not yet reached the steady state. The red curve repre-
sents the logical signal that pilots the driver; the blue curve represents the
effective output voltage of the driver.
Hence the driver modulator can be any electronic circuit able to charge and
discharge a capacitor satisfying the temporal requirements stated above.
4.3 Theoretical preliminary notions
The typical circuit needed to charge (or discharge) a capacitor can be
modeled as an RLC series circuit (Figure 4.3). The system response to a
stepped input is characterized by a set of parameters. We will recall the
most interesting ones as a function of the circuit parameters
ζ =
R
2
√
C
L
Damping factor (4.3)
ωm =
1√
LC
Undamped resonance (4.4)
(4.5)
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The damping ratio determines the type of response we will get, as follow
ζ < 1 Underdamped (4.6)
ζ = 1 Critically damped (4.7)
ζ > 1 Overdamped (4.8)
(4.9)
Figure 4.3: RLC circuit model.
In particular, an underdamped response will be characterize by an oscil-
latory behaviour and fast switching time, an overdamped response instead
will be characterize by a non-oscillatory behaviour with slow switching
time, and finally a critically damped response will be characterized by an
average switching time in absence of oscillations. In Figure 4.4 the three
type of response are reported.
The following parameters are of particular interest in the underdamped
response
α =
R
2L
Neper frequency (attenuation) (4.10)
ω =
√
1
LC
+
R2
4L2
Damped resonance (4.11)
tr ≈ 1.8
wn
Rise time (4.12)
The oscillations in the response has a period that is T = 2pi
ω
, and exponen-
tially decrease with a time constant τ = 1
α
. In Figure 4.5 are shown the
main parameters that characterize the underdamped response.
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Figure 4.4: Step response of an RLC circuit for different values of the
damping factor ζ .
4.4 Half bridge driver
The first circuit we have designed realized a simple half-bridge scheme. In
this scheme two n-MOSFETs are connected in series between the power
supply voltage VDD and ground, and the output voltage is picked in the
node between the two (Figure 4.6). The two MOSFETs are turned on and
off alternatively, so that when a MOSFET is on, the other is off and vice
versa. By using this configuration, it is important to properly drive the
two MOSFETs to prevent the generation of shoot-through currents that
can occur if the two MOSFETs are turned on contemporary, thus leading
to a short circuit. A MOSFET driver is therefore necessary. Moreover the
driver is needed to charge and discharge the gate of the MOSFET very fast,
in such a way to achieve very short switching times. The main advantage
of the half bridge configuration is that the dissipation of power happens
only when a switch occur, so that the output voltage can be kept in a high
state or low state for an unlimited time without any power dissipation.
Since the output voltage should be modulated as a function of a string of
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Figure 4.5: Parameters of the underdamped step response.
bit as follow
{0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, · · ·} → {0, 0, VDD, 0, VDD, VDD, VDD, · · · } (4.13)
even though in the worst case the voltage need to be changed every bit, in
an average case, where there are some bit sequence with the same value,
the voltage can be maintained steady leading to a lower power dissipation.
Although the scheme is pretty simple, the high voltage and the high-
switching frequencies involved require a careful choice of the components
to be used, and a correct layout design.
4.4.1 Electronic components and layout
The high-switching frequency the circuit will be subjected make the pres-
ence of stray inductance relevant. In the particular case of a half-bridge
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Figure 4.6: Half-bridge driver schematic (green rectangle). An external
TTL signal drives a non-inverting high-side driver and an inverting low-
side driver. The two drivers turn on and off two n-MOSFETs alternatively
making the central node voltage to switch between 0 and VDD. A damper
resistance is placed in series with the load to reduce the oscillations in the
output voltage. The output voltage is applied to an equivalent capacitive
load of 14 pF (red rectangle).
structure, where there are no resistive components other than the small
MOSFET internal resistances, the stray inductance can couple with the ca-
pacitive load leading to oscillatory behaviour of the output voltage. Stray
inductance mainly arises from the presence of wires and from the compo-
nent package connections. In particular the MOSFET has a gate parasitic
inductance (LG) that when subjected to high frequency act as an open
circuit, thus isolating the MOSFET gate from the driver. Moreover, the
parasitic source inductance (LS) can lead to oscillatory state because of
the negative voltage drop that happens when a large current derivative
is present, which is a consequence of a voltage switch on the MOSFET
[20]. To reduce the stray inductance we have implemented the circuit in a
Printed Circuit Board (PCB) using only Surface Mounted Device (SMD).
In our layout (Figure 4.7) we have used a single FDS89161LZ chip
that is a SO-8 package containing two n-MOSFETs. The MOSFET can
sustain a drain-source voltage up to 100 V and can achieve theoretically
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switching times lower than 10 ns, thanks to the low on-state resistance.
The particular model of MOSFETs has a low input capacitance, needed to
reduce the power dissipation on the driver. Having two MOSFETs on the
same die assures that the specifics are almost identical. In particular, it
is important that their switching and delay times are almost identical to
prevent the appearance of shoot-through currents, which can be destructive
for the circuit. A MAX15019BASA+ MOSFET driver have been used to
drive the two MOSFETs. This integrated circuit is specifically designed
to drive two n-MOSFETs in a half bridge configuration. It can be driven
with a single TTL input which commands both the internal time-matched
drivers. It provides a connection for a boost capacitor, required to ensure
an adequate charge to switch the high-side MOSFET. Further, it provides
an internal break-before-make logic circuit able to prevent shoot-through
currents during the output state changes. The driver is mounted as close
as possible to the two MOSFETs to minimize stray inductance. In the
output stage, a resistance is connected in series with the load to reduce
the undesired oscillations and an optional zener diode can be mounted to
clip the overvoltage. To dissipate the heat generated by the driver and
the MOSFET packages, an heat sink have been mounted on the top of the
board and connected to the component with a silicon thermal interface. To
provide the high voltage to the circuit two bench power supply have been
connect in series allowing to obtain a voltage up to 95 V. To protect the
two power supplies against harmful reverse voltage during the power-on
phase, a diodes protection system have been implemented on the board.
Finally both the MOSFET and driver power supply have been equipped
with filter capacitors to stabilize the voltage.
4.4.2 Power dissipation
The more the switching frequency is raised the more power will be dissi-
pated on the components, and so it needs to be properly dissipated. In
a full cycle required to fully charge and discharge a capacitor, the total
power dissipation is given by
P = CLV
2
DDf (4.14)
where CL is the capacitance of the load, VDD is the power supply voltage
and f is the switching frequency.
In the output stage the power is dissipated over the internal resistance
of the MOSFETs. Considering that CL = 14 pF, VDD = 90 V and a
switching frequency of 1 MHz the resulting power dissipation is 113.4 mW
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Figure 4.7: Half-bridge driver PCB layout.
which can well sustained by the MOSFET package without the need of
a particular heat-sink. The most critical power dissipation source is the
MOSFET driver, in fact it needs to move a greater amount of charge to
drive the gate of the MOSFETs. The input capacitance of the particular
chosen MOSFET is very low to minimize the power dissipation in the
driver, and its maximum value is Ciss = 302 pF. Other than this, the
driver dissipates more power also to charge the bootstrap diode.
4.4.3 Results
The electronic signal was first measured with an oscilloscope probe with-
out the modulator attached and without any damping output resistance.
The load has been provided by the 10x attenuated probe equivalent capac-
itance which have been estimated in about 15 pF. The output capacitance
of the MOSFETs also contributes to form the total load capacitance. This
has been estimated in 130 pF. The waveform measured is shown in Fig-
ure 4.8a. From this measure and solving the system of equations (4.10)
(4.11) we have derived a total resistive component of 2.24 ohm and a to-
tal stray inductance of 187 nH. In Figure 4.8b is reported the result of
the SPICE simulation performed with these values. Feeding the value of
capacitance and inductance derived to (4.3) we found the value to be as-
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signed to the damping resistor to obtain a critically damped response. The
value obtained is 75 ohm, but we inserted in the circuit a 50 ohm resistor
to achieve better rise time. What we have seen is that the falling edge
doesn’t show the ringing any more while in the rising edge (Figure 4.9a)
still suffer from an anomalous oscillatory behaviour which correspond to
the first peaks that can also be seen in Figure 4.8a and that doesn’t agree
with the theoretical prediction. Finally in Figure 4.9b is shown the modu-
lated optical pulse, obtained by operating the driver at 60 V. We see that
it is possible to obtain a very good rise time under 10 ns and a falling time
in the order of 25 ns, even though there is a strong oscillation in the first
50 ns of the high state of the pulse. A further increase of the damping
resistance will eliminate the oscillation but will lead to a too long falling
time.
(a) Electrical output (b) SPICE simulation
Figure 4.8: Half bridge driver undamped output. When no damping re-
sistor is placed in series with the output the driver shoes an excessive
oscillatory behaviour, which can’t be used to drive the modulator.
We have seen that the circuit can operate in a stable way with switching
frequency up to 500 KHz. The circuit has been tested with frequency up
to 1 MHz but in this range the probability of a driver breakdown is high.
The breakdown was probably caused by a non perfect heat sink structure.
We finally note that the oscillatory behavior will lead to the non perfect
polarization of about 5 optical pulses, so that the QBER will be slightly
increased. Considering an operating frequency of 500 KHz which corre-
spond to a period of 2000 ns we can estimate the increase of the QBER in
the worst case as the ratio between the RMS value of the oscillation and
the steady value of the signal, multiplied by the fraction of the switching
period where the oscillations happen. With our data this QBER increment
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has been estimated in 3%, which can be considered enough good for our
application.
(a) Electrical output (b) Optical output
Figure 4.9: Half bridge driver damped output. When a 50 ohm resistor is
placed in series with the load, the driver is able to switch a high voltage
within few tens of ns with a minimal oscillatory behaviour.
4.5 Pull-up resistor driver
To try to reach higher switching frequency we choose to build a through-
hole components circuit, which can be easily cooled with the use of properly
heat sink. One of the disadvantage of the through hole components is that
they carry higher stray inductance. The other problem is that it was
not possible to find components with the required specifics that carry two
MOSFETs in the same package. Moreover it was not possible to find
integrated driver specific for a half bridge configuration. This means that
the timing management to correctly drive a half bridge structure in order
to prevent shoot-through currents and good rising and falling times, would
have to be made manually in the software of the FPGA that control the two
drivers. So we prefer to try a new scheme which requires the use of a single
driver and a single MOSFET (Figure 4.10). This configuration consists in
a series of a pull-up resistor and an n-MOSFET connected between VDD
and ground. The output voltage is picked in the node in between the two.
The main disadvantage of this configuration is that a constant current flow
through the resistor when the MOSFET is kept in an on-state, so that the
power dissipation is much higher than a half-bridge configuration.
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Figure 4.10: Pull-up resistor driver schematic (green rectangle). An ex-
ternal TTL signal drives a non-inverting low-side driver. When the n-
MOSFETs is off, the voltage in the output node is kept at VDD. When
it is turned on, it brings the potential of the output node to ground, and
a constant current begins to flow in the resistor, thus making it dissipate
power. A zener diode is placed in parallel to the load to clip any overvolt-
age. The output voltage is applied to an equivalent capacitive load of 14
pF (red rectangle).
4.5.1 Electronic components and layout
The circuit has been realized using an IRF610 n-MOSFET, which provide
a very low input capacitance and switching time under 17 ns. The driver is
an IXD614 and it is able to operate the MOSFET at its maximum speed.
A 180 ohm power resistor able to sustain up to 35 W was used. In the
final configuration two of these resistors have been mounted in parallel to
halve the resistance. A zener diode with 91 V breakdown voltage has been
placed in parallel with the load in order to cut any overshoot voltage. All
the components have been mounted on a dual layer PCB board. Also this
circuit has been equipped with a protection circuit to connect two bench
power supplies in series. The logical input and the high voltage output are
connected to the FPGA and to the modulator driver through two SMA
cables plugged in the SMA connectors mounted on the board. The PCB
layout of the circuit is shown in Figure 4.11 while a picture of the final
PCB board is reported in Figure 4.12.
60 Development of a high voltage driver
(a) Top layer
(b) Bottom layer
Figure 4.11: Pull-up resistor driver PCB layout.
4.5.2 Power dissipation
The most critical component in this circuit is the resistor. In fact the
average power dissipated on it is
1
2
V 2DD
R
(4.15)
due to the fact that the MOSFET will be in an on-state half of the time,
since it follows the random modulating sequence of bits (see (4.13)). Oper-
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Figure 4.12: Pull-up resistor final PCB board.
ating the circuit at with a voltage of 90 V will lead to a power dissipation
over each of the resistance of 22.5 W.
Both the MOSFET and the driver have been provided of heat sinks in
order to avoid components failure due to high power dissipation. Finally
a fan has been mounted on the top of the board to cool all the heat sinks.
4.5.3 Results
Firstly, the driver have been tested with a 90 ohm resistor, obtained as a
parallel of two 180 ohm resistors, and
without the zener diode in the output. What we have seen is a fast
switching time accompanied by an oscillatory behaviour like in the case of
the half-bridge driver. Instead of increasing the output resistance to reduce
the oscillations we mounted the zener diode in parallel with the load and
we were able to drastically reduce the oscillations. The modulated optical
output of the polarization modulator driven by this circuit with VDD = 84V
is shown in Figure 4.13. We were able to achieve switching time in the order
of 15 ns both in the rising edge and in the falling edge. Some oscillations
there are still present right after the rising edge, but their RMS value is
sufficiently low to affect only little the QBER. With this configuration we
have reached switching frequency up to 800 KHz without any failure of
the components, probability thanks to the better heat sink system. We
have noticed that when the switching frequency is increased the voltage
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overshoot tends to rise. Even tough, we can see in Figure 4.13d that the
overshoot affect only a tenth of the period. In an average case, where
the voltage is not switched every bit, the effect of the overshoot on the
polarization errors will be even less important.
(a) Rising Edge (b) Falling edge
(c) 10 KHz switching frequency (d) 800 KHz switching frequency
Figure 4.13: Optical output from the polarization modulator at different
switching frequency (VDD = 84V ).
Finally we evaluated the quality of the polarization obtained after the
modulation by calculating the visibility of the V and L polarization (Fig-
ure 4.15). To achieve this we have used the optical setup shown in Fig-
ure 4.14.
The optical power of the components of the output light beam was first
measured in the H/V basis obtaining a visibility of the 98.8% for the V
polarization, then it was measured in the L/R basis obtaining a visibility
of 94% for the L polarization when a voltage of 84 V was used and 98.7%
when a voltage of 90 V was used (Figure 4.15). From this last observation
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(a) Optical scheme
(b) Real implementation
Figure 4.14: Polarization quality measure optical setup. A 532 nm laser
beam has been vertically polarized. The resulting bean has been passed
through a series of a half-wave retarder and a quarter-wave retarder in order
to pre-compensate any change in the polarization made by the modulator.
In this way the beam out coming from the modulator in a rest condition is
vertically polarized. A quarter-wave retarder has been placed at the output
of the modulator in order to change the measurement basis from H/V to
L/R. The final PBS allows performing the measurement in the H/V basis.
The optical intensity has been measured with a fast photodiode.
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we have concluded that the polarization modulator half wave voltage must
be greater than the one specified in the datasheet. Moreover with a voltage
of 90 V our driver achieved better result in term of oscillations due to the
fact that the zener was working nearer to its breakdown voltage.
(a) Vertical (b) Horizontal
(c) Circular left (d) Circular right
Figure 4.15: A vertical polarized laser beam is modulated and become
circularly left polarized. The components of the obtained polarization are
measured in the H/V basis and in the L/R basis to estimate the quality of
resulting polarization. In the upper part of the graph is shown the optical
power, while in the lower part is shown the electric pulse.
Chapter 5
QKD system controller
A quantum cryptographic system requires in general an electronic con-
troller with high timing accuracy and computation capabilities to properly
work. In our case the controller is required to drive the polarization mod-
ulator driver in order to prepare the qubit to be sent over the quantum
channel, and to control the two shutters present in the system. In this sec-
tion we firstly introduce the shutter scheduling protocol we have used and
then we will briefly discuss the current FPGA implementation. Finally we
will show the results obtained when the FPGA have been integrated in the
real QKD system realized in the MLRO station.
5.1 Shutter characterization
The shutters used in the system are two Thorlabs SH05. The clear aperture
has a diameter of 12.7 mm [21]. The shutters is characterized by the
following four timing parameters
• Open/close delay It is the time that passes from the instant when
the logical input is given, to the instant when the shutter begins to
open or close respectively.
• Opening/closing time It is the time that passes from the instant
when the shutter begins to open (close) to the instant when the
shutter is fully open (close).
• Small area opening/closing time If the laser beam to be blocked
is smaller than the full aperture of the shutter the opening and closing
time can be regarded as the time needed to fully block or unblock the
beam. These times are usually smaller than the opening and closing
times.
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• Pulse rate The maximum frequency the shutter can be operated.
The timing parameter for the SH05 shutter have been evaluated in the
laboratory by measuring with a photodiode the optical intensity of a laser
beam, made to pass through the shutter. The variation of the intensity due
to the shutter action traces a waveform from which the timing parameters
can be extrapolated. The results are reported in Table 5.1.
Direction Delay Switching time
12.7 mm 0.5 mm
Open 9 ms 2 ms 0.4 ms
Close 11 ms 4 ms 0.5 ms
Table 5.1: Thorlabs SH05 shutter timing specification
Another important thing we got from the measures is that the shutter
can be operated at frequency higher than 10 Hz, that means it can there
be more than one open/close cycle within 10 ms. The limitation we have
seen is that if from a closed position of the shutter, a command of the type
open-close-open (where the close duration is on the order of 10-15 ms) is
given to the shutter, there is the possibility that the shutter does not fully
close. In particular, this happens when the first open command is smaller
than 20-25 ms. This will be of particular interest for the transmission and
reception scheduling we are going to illustrate in the next section.
5.2 Transmission and reception shutter sched-
uling
As already stated in Section 2.4.2, the QKD system we have implemented
will operate the transmitter and the receiver in different moments to avoid
unwanted background noise in the receiver. The transmission of the qubits
should start right after the laser ranging pulse is sent to the telescope,
and should last until that pulse returns to the ground station after being
reflected by the satellite. The reception should begin immediately after
receiving the laser ranging pulse. In this way the laser ranging pulse,
which trigger the START and STOP signal, can be used as a reference
to correlate the sent and the received qubits of the QKD system. The
alternation of the transmission and reception phases will be achieved with
the use of the two shutters. Moreover the shutters are required to block all
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the high energy laser pulses generated by the laser ranging system to avoid
damages in the PMT. The ideal time diagram of the shutters is shown in
Figure 5.1a.
If we consider a situation where a LEO satellite, which orbit is up to
2000 Km, is used to back-reflect the laser pulse, we get that the Round
Trip Time (RTT) is on the order of 20-25 ms [22]. Since the useful time
for the transmission of the qubits corresponds to the RTT, we see that in
this case only the 25 % of a 10 ms cycle would be used to exchange the
key, that means the protocol has a 25% temporal efficiency. The lower is
this value the lower will be the bit rate of the generated key. Beside this,
it would be completely impossible to send any qubits because the shutters
will not be able to fully open and close in such a short time. Because of
this, the experiment can only be performed using MEO satellites, which
have a RTT that varies in the range 100-200 ms according with the specific
satellite orbit and the position respect the zenith.
If we consider the time between two START signals (10 ms) as the
base time slot, we can divide a transmission/reception cycle in three of
these time slots. Referring to Figure 5.1, we see that the first slot begins
in correspondence of the first laser ranging pulse (START-1). In this slot
only the transmitter is active. The third slot begins with START-3 and
here only the receiver is active. The first returning laser ranging pulse
(STOP-1) will fall in the second time slot. When this pulse is registered the
system should switch from transmission to reception. Since the position of
STOP-1 is different for different MEO satellites, we can have the following
different situations
• The RTT is 150 ms (ideal case). This means the generic START
and STOP signals are separated by 50 ms and the STOP-1 fall in
the middle of the second slot. In this case the transmission and
reception time are the same and the QKD system has a temporal
efficiency of 50%.
• The RTT is in the range 125-175 ms. In this case the transmission
and reception times are asymmetric. The useful time for the QKD
protocol to collect qubits corresponds to the minimum of this two
times. If the transmission time is higher than the reception time
means that some transmitted qubits will be not received, whereas in
the opposite case the receiver will be active even when no qubits are
expected to come back.
• The RTT is in the ranges 100-125 ms. In this case the START
and STOP signals are too close and the shutter will be kept close
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(a) Average case
(b) Worst case
Figure 5.1: Shutters open/close time diagram. The transmission and the
reception phase are separated in time. The receiver shutter is closed when
a START or STOP signal is expected, to protect the receiver PMT. If the
distance of two generic START and STOP signals is less than 25 ms the
receiver shutter is kept close between them to avoid missing closure. The
position of the STOP-1 signals (which varies as a function of the altitude of
the considered satellite) determines the temporal efficiency of the protocol.
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between START-3 STOP-2 in order to avoid a missing closure due
to the limited repetition frequency of the shutter. Because of this a
small fraction of the sent qubits will be not received. In this case the
transmission time approaches the minimum and the time efficiency
can be as low as 30%.
• The RTT is in the ranges 175-200 ms. This is the worst case (Fig-
ure 5.1b. Here the reception time approaches the minimum and the
shutter cannot be opened for most of the third slot because of the
proximity of the START and STOP signals. Here the time efficiency
can be as low as 15%.
5.3 QKD system controller implementation
We have implemented the controller using a Field Programmable Gate
Array (FPGA) (Figure 5.5). In particular we have used an ML605 board
equipped with a Virtex 6 FPGA. The board has a 200 MHz clock that can
be up scaled up to 700 MHz with the use of the internal PLL logic circuitry.
Such clock frequency together with the timing constraint verification tools
made available by the board development environment, make possible to
drive both the modulator and the shutters with the required precision.
The language used to program the FPGA is VHDL.
The FPGA needs two reference signals to properly synchronize our
system to the laser ranging one. The first signal (START) comes from a
photodiode, and it indicates the exact instant in which the laser ranging
pulse is sent to the telescope. A second signal (STOP) is generated by the
laser ranging receiver PMT and indicates the instant in which the pulse is
received back. Both the signals follow the Nuclear Instrumentation Module
(NIM) standard, that means among other things that the signals voltages
are negative. Since such voltage cannot be provided as input to the FPGA,
we built a two-channel NIM to TTL converter. The converter can translate
the signal from one standard to the other without introducing delays and
assuring very steep rising and falling edges.
5.3.1 Shutter controller block
A shutter controller block has been realized in the FPGA in order to drive
the two shutters. The block implements a state machine that works as
follow
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1. Initially the state machine is in an idle state in which both the trans-
mitter and the receiver shutters are kept closed.
2. When the first START (START-1) trigger happens the transmission
shutter is opened. The state machine stays in this state until the
first STOP (STOP-0) trigger happens. To be noted that while the
START signal is practically always triggered, the STOP trigger can
be not present. In fact if the telescope tracking is not yet stable,
there won’t be any reflected pulse from the telescope, so that the
photodiode won’t be triggered.
3. When STOP-0 is triggered, the state machine moves to the next
state in which it activate a counter that will be used to predict the
temporal position of the next incoming pulses.
4. The state machine moves to the next state when START-2 is trig-
gered and another counter will be started. This counter will be used
to predict the next STARTs position. At this point the FPGA uses
the two counters to predict the positions of the next leaving and in-
coming pulses of light without the need of the START and STOP
signal. These predictions are used to close the shutters before the
instants where the pulses pass.
5. Before the STOP 1 signal, the transmitter shutter is closed and right
after the receiver shutter is opened.
6. Finally the FPGA will close the receiver shutter before every ex-
pected laser ranging pulse and will reopen it right after, a part from
the case when the next pulse is expected within 25 ms from the
current pulse.
The characteristic timing parameters of the shutter have been coded
into the software, but it is possible to adjust them by changing the position
of an array of dip switches mounted on the board. Furthermore, it is also
possible to vary the amount of time which the shutter should stay closed
before and after the expected pulse. A shorter time allows to increment the
temporal efficiency but increases the risk that the shutter does not close
in time to fully block the pulse. By using these switches it was possible to
quickly calibrate the shutter controller installed in the real setup.
An array of eight leds has been used to show the state of the state
machine in order to allow a faster debug.
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5.3.2 Modulator controller block
The current implementation of the modulator controller block is pretty
simple. In fact it just produces a square wave signal of a chosen frequency
in correspondence to the transmission phase. The square wave produced
will drive the polarization modulator to produce the desired qubits. The
square wave needs to be correctly aligned in time to the reference START
signal in order to allow the time-tagger to discriminate the different polar-
ized photons.
Of course once the experiment will be proved to work, the modulator
controller can be extended in order to drive the modulator with a true
random key.
5.4 Results
The FPGA controller have been integrated and tested in the MLRO lab-
oratory. A first test was performed by using as input to the FPGA two
logical signals (not the ones from the photodiodes) for the START and
the STOP. The first signal is a 10 Hz signal used as reference time by the
source laser of the observatory, while the second signal is a prediction of
the STOP signal that can be extrapolated from the data collected by the
laser ranging system when a satellite tracking is ongoing. In Figure 5.2 is
shown the time diagram for the transmission shutter. As we can see the
controller is able to predict the position of the start and stop signals and
thus is able to close the shutter in time. In Figure 5.3 are shown the time
diagrams for the receiver shutter for different RTT. As we can see different
relative position between the START and the STOP signals will lead to
different temporal efficiencies.
Finally the QKD system controller has been operated in the laser room
in a real operative situation. Also in this case it was able to correctly drives
the two shutter preventing so any damage to the PMT.
5.5 Future development
We aim to further develop the QKD system controller in order to support
more advanced functions. An already work in progress update of the soft-
ware will allow to fully control the parameters of the controller directly
from the PC in real time by exploiting the Ethernet connection present on
the board. A PC interface program has already been implemented even
though the FPGA UDP block is not yet completed (Figure ??). Moreover
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(a) Panoramic view (b) Zommed view
Figure 5.2: Shutter controller test results - Transmission. In figure are
shown the START (violet) and STOP (green) signals, the logical command
sent to the receiver shutter (yellow) and the real state of the transmission
shutter (blue).
the PC connection with the FPGA can be used to stream a random key
directly from the computer in order to operate the QKD system in real
time.
To increase the temporal efficiency of the protocol we recently think of
a new setup that can be employed. This consists in placing the transmis-
sion shutter in front of the MLRO source laser in order to block also the
laser ranging pulses when the system is in the reception phase. This will
eliminates two out of three START and STOP signals so that it won’t be
necessary to block them, thus leaving the receiver shutter open for a longer
time. Moreover this will reduce the optical background noise generated by
the strong light pulses of the laser ranging system. Of course the feasibility
of this idea needs to be discussed with the engineers of the MLRO since it
will modify the laser ranging system.
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(a) RTT = 102 ms (b) RTT = 130 ms
(c) RTT = 131 ms (d) RTT = 172 ms
Figure 5.3: Shutter controller test results - Reception. In figure are shown
the START (violet) and STOP (green) signals, the logical command sent
to the receiver shutter (yellow) and the real state of the receiver shutter
(blue).
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Figure 5.4: QKD system controller PC interface.
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Figure 5.5: Block diagram of the QKD system controller
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Conclusion
In this work we have presented the architecture of a QKD system realized
upon the existing facilities of the satellite laser ranging station located in
Matera, which aims to be the first system to be able to operate a full QKD
protocol between a satellite and a ground station.
In particular we address the problem of the implementation of the part
of the transmitter that is responsible of the qubits state preparation. The
qubits can be prepared in two different state of polarization by using an
electro-optic polarization modulator which has been analyzed in detail.
We then presented the high voltage driver which has been realized in our
laboratory. In particular we were able to operate the modulator with
switching frequencies up to 800 KHz while providing a quite stable output
that guaranteed an elevated quality of the polarization impressed to the
photons.
Then we presented an FPGA implementation of a QKD system con-
troller which has been firstly accurately tested in the laboratory to assure
that it could be used to shield the photodiode from the high energy pulses
of the laser ranging system. Then it has been tested in a real operating
condition, thus proving its efficacy. We also presented a possible improve-
ment in the optical setup, which implies positioning the shutter in front of
the MLRO source laser, in order to increase the temporal efficiency of our
system.
Thanks to the work presented here all the pieces of the QKD system
are now complete, so that the full system could be tested. Unfortunately
during the preliminary test of the system in the MLRO station, the tele-
scope receiver has suffered some problems so that we were unable to carry
out the full experiment. Soon we will be ready to test the system again,
and if the test will gives positive results, we will finally prove the feasibility
of satellite QKD, making so the first step towards the creation of a global
quantum cryptographic satellite networks.
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